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Foreign direct investment (FDI) of Germany in Latin America reveals various
peculiarities that may shape future investment relations. However, two major
concerns are largely unfounded:
- In contrast to widespread fears in Germany, FDI outflows are highly unlikely
to have added to labor market problems.
- Host country concerns that the Eastern enlargement of the EU may divert
German FDI away from Latin America seem to be unjustified.
German investors have responded relatively weakly to new investment
opportunities in Latin America. Some of the traditional features of German FDI in
this region, notably the predominant orientation towards large local markets, may
work against closer investment relations in the era of globalization. Much
depends on whether Latin American host countries succeed in improving
international competitiveness in industries in which German FDI is concentrated.
JEL classification: F21I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a heavily debated issue in both Germany and
Latin America. In Germany, concerns are that the huge discrepancy between high
and rising FDI outflows and minor FDI inflows indicates deficient investment
conditions and adds to unemployment problems.
1 Especially German FDI in
developing regions is widely perceived to impair the employment and wage
prospects of low-skilled workers in Germany. In Latin America, concerns are that
fiercer worldwide competition for FDI may render it difficult to sustain the recent
boom of capital inflows into the region. The emergence of transition economies in
Asia (notably China) and Central and Eastern Europe on international capital
markets may divert the attention of foreign investors away from more traditional
host countries of FDI in Latin America. One may suspect that particularly
German FDI is subject to FDI diversion, taking into account the attractions of
investing in neighboring transition economies.
On closer inspection, these concerns have little substance. As will be shown
below, relocation of labor intensive production from Germany to lower wage
locations by means of FDI has played a minor role. Moreover, adjustment
pressure on the German economy resulting from FDI in Latin America has
remained particularly weak. At the same time, the empirical evidence does not
1 For recent analyses of FDI patterns and investment conditions in Germany, see, e.g.,
Nunnenkamp (1996), Klodt and Maurer (1996), and Jost (1997).support the notion of significant FDI diversion to the detriment of Latin America.
Yet, German FDI patterns in Latin America reveal striking peculiarities,
compared with FDI from other sources. German investors seem to have
responded less enthusiastically to new investment opportunities in Latin America.
Some of the traditional features of German FDI in this region may work against
closer investment relations in the era of globalization.
II. MAJOR TRENDS IN GERMAN FDI IN DEVELOPING REGIONS
1. The Position of Latin America and the Caribbean
Depending on perspective, investment relations between Germany and Latin
America (including the Caribbean) reveal a strikingly different picture. From
Latin America's point of view, inward FDI from Germany plays a modest role.
Germany contributed less than 5 per cent to total FDI flows to Latin America
since the mid-1980s, and Germany's share in total FDI stocks held in Latin
America was only slightly higher (Figure 1). Comparing the trend in FDI stocks,
Germany was outperformed by almost all other major investor countries in this
region (Figure 2). For instance, FDI stocks held by the United States and Japan
were four and 3.5 times higher in 1994 than in 1985, compared with an increase
in German FDI stocks of less than 80 per cent during the same period. This












Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (a; b); OECD (1996); UNCTAD (1997).
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reported in US$. —
 bNo data available for 1985 and 1986. —
 cExcluding Mexico.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (a); OECD (1996).1990. As it seems, German investors were lagging behind other foreign investors
in responding to the improving investment climate in Latin America. German
investors recovered lost ground in the 1990s, however, when they reported the
steepest increase in FDI stocks.
By contrast, from the German perspective, FDI appears to be biased heavily
towards Latin America if German FDI outside the OECD area is considered to be
the yardstick (for an earlier analysis, see Nunnenkamp 1991). Latin American
host countries accounted for about two thirds of FDI stocks held by Germany in
all developing countries in the 1980s (Figure 3).
2 This share declined to
somewhat less than 50 per cent until 1995. Nonetheless, it remained substantially
above Latin America's share in FDI stocks held by all investor countries in all
developing host countries.
How to reconcile the bias of German investors towards Latin America with their
minor role in overall FDI in this region? Relatively low FDI of Germany in
developing countries as a whole provides the explanation. Less than 10 per cent
of total FDI outflows of Germany were directed to non-OECD host countries
(including Mexico) in 1985-1994. The corresponding share was almost three
times as large in the case of Japanese FDI outflows, and almost four times as
2 In the following, Central and Eastern Europe is considered to be part of the developing
world.Figure 3 — Share of Latin America in FDI Stocks Held by Germany and All
Investor Countries in Developing Regions
a, 1980-1995
per cent 11 Germany
El all investor
countries
1980 1985 1990 1995
including transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (a); UNCTAD (1997).
large in the case of US FDI outflows (Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1997: Table
3). Similar discrepancies prevailed with regard to outward FDI stocks in 1990.
Developing countries as a whole accounted for 10 per cent of German FDI
stocks, 25 per cent of US FDI stocks and 32 per cent of Japanese FDI stocks
(OECD 1996). Only recently, the balance of German FDI shifted somewhat
towards developing countries. Not surprisingly, this shift was minor with respect
to FDI stocks (to 13 per cent in 1995), given that FDI stocks tend to be relatively
stable. In terms of German FDI flows, developing countries doubled their share to
an annual average of about 20 per cent in 1993-1996 (Deutsche Bundesbank c).These trends provide some tentative clues related to the concerns mentioned in
the introduction. First, the extremely strong concentration of German FDI in
similarly advanced OECD countries casts doubts on the widely held belief that
FDI has contributed significantly to labor market problems in Germany. If
relocation of production by means of FDI in lower cost locations had a major
labor market impact, Germany should suffer from less severe labor market
problems than the United States and Japan, for which FDI in developing countries
figured more prominently. A comparison of labor market outcomes in major
industrial countries reveals exactly the opposite pattern (Gundlach and
Nunnenkamp 1997). The question that remains is whether the recent rise of
German FDI in developing countries in general, and in Latin America in
particular, is likely to have more serious labor market implications. This issue is
taken up in Section IV again. Second, the traditional bias of German investors
towards Latin America seems to justify Latin American concerns about FDI
diversion, even though the potential costs cannot be excessive because of
Germany's minor contribution to overall FDI in this region in the past. However,
the subsequent section shows that convincing evidence for significant diversion of
German FDI to the detriment of Latin America does not exist.2. Major Competitors of Latin America
Any discussion of FDI diversion suffers from conceptual limitations. In contrast
to trade diversion resulting from discriminatory trade policies, the notion of FDI
diversion lacks analytical foundation. Germany does not apply economic policies
that discriminate explicitly between FDI in different host regions, nor does the
EU. In other words, there is no direct link between economic policy in Germany
on the one hand, and the traditional bias of German investors towards Latin
America and their conceivable reorientation towards other developing regions on
the other hand. Yet, economic policy may influence locational choices of
investors in an indirect way. Most importantly perhaps, Latin America may face a
competitive disadvantage in attracting German FDI after transition economies in
Central and Eastern Europe became closely associated with the EU. Especially
the prospective EU members among transition economies will benefit from
unrestricted access to EU markets. This provides a major stimulus to German FDI
in these economies. It is in this sense that the notion of FDI diversion is used in
the following. Another problem almost impossible to resolve is to determine the
empirical significance of FDI diversion. The counterfactual is unknown, i.e., it is
open to question what would have happened to German FDI in Latin America if
Central and Eastern Europe had not emerged as a new competitor. Moreover, it
cannot be identified whether the effects on Latin America would have beendifferent if Central and Eastern Europe had not been offered preferential access to
EU markets.
These constraints notwithstanding, various observations suggest that FDI
diversion to the detriment of Latin America has played a minor role (see also
Nunnenkamp 1997b). Table 1 reveals that German FDI in developing regions is
anything else but a zero-sum game. All developing regions received increasing























Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (b); OECD (1996).
FDI inflows from Germany since the mid-1980s. Hence, new investment
opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe are more likely to have added to
German FDI, rather than having diverted German FDI away from other locations.
The relatively modest increase in German FDI flows to Latin America (by a
factor of 2.2, comparing period averages of 1989-1992 and 1993-1996) is not
inconsistent with this view. If this modest increase were attributed to FDIdiversion, it would be difficult to explain why not only Central and Eastern
Europe, but also Asia received FDI inflows from Germany in 1993-1996 in the
( order of four times the inflows of 1989-1992. FDI diversion should have affected
Latin America and Asia, considering that both regions were confronted with new
and somehow privileged competitors for German FDI.
Likewise, the development of German FDI stocks in Latin America and in
competing developing regions does not point to significant FDI diversion.
Valuation effects may have a considerable impact on stock data. This applies
especially to Latin America, where German investors were strongly engaged in
the 1970s and 1980s already. Yet it is striking that FDI stocks held in Latin
America were more or less stagnant in the 1980s, i.e., before Central and Eastern
Europe competed for German FDI (Figure 4). Moreover, it was exactly when
Central and Eastern Europe absorbed soaring FDI from Germany that German
FDI stocks in Latin America rose as well. In both regions, FDI stocks increased
by about DM 10 billion between 1990 and 1995 (compared with an increase of
DM 6 billion in Asia).
7 All in all, past trends suggest that German FDI in Latin America was mainly
determined by investors' perceptions of investment conditions in this particular
region, rather than by FDI developments in other regions. Structural
characteristics of German FDI in Latin America may shed more light on investors'
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III. STRUCTURE OF GERMAN FDI IN LATIN AMERICA
1. Major Host Countries
The regional bias of German FDI in non-OECD countries towards Latin America
went along with a strong concentration of FDI within this region.3 Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico together accounted for 90 per cent of German FDI stocks in
We mainly refer to FDI stocks in this section. Particularly for smaller host countries, FDI
inflows are volatile and often not disclosed for reasons of confidentiality.11
Latin America in 1985 and 1995 (Table 2). In comparison, about three quarters of
FDI stocks of all foreign investors in Latin America were located in these three
economies.
Brazil was the most important host country for German and all foreign investors.
However, the focus on Brazil was exceptionally strong in the case of German
FDI. Brazil accounted for four times as much of German FDI than the next
important host country (Mexico) in 1995, although FDI stocks had shifted
somewhat from Brazil to Mexico since 1985.
4 Even in per-capita terms, German
FDI stocks in 1995 were highest in Brazil among the countries considered in
Table 2, followed by Argentina, Chile and Mexico. By contrast, relatively small
countries (Chile and Costa Rica) ranked first and second in terms of per-capita
FDI stocks of all investors, while Brazil ranked only fifth.
According to flow data, locational choices of German investors continued to be
biased heavily towards Brazil in the most recent past. Brazil received 61 per cent
of accumulated FDI flows from Germany to Latin America, excluding Cayman
Islands, in 1993-1996 (Deutsche Bundesbank c). In contrast to Table 2, flow
data do not point to a reorientation of German investors towards Mexico. Rather,
the share of Mexico in accumulated FDI flows to Latin America, excluding
Cayman Islands, was down to 3.2 per cent in 1993-1996.
FDI stocks of all foreign investors in Brazil were just 1.5 times their FDI stocks in
Mexico.12
Table 2 — Host Country Structure of German FDI Stocks in Latin America and the
Caribbean,




















































































































































aExcluding the subsequent offshore financial centres: Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman
Islands, Netherlands Antilles and Panama. —
 DIn parentheses: US$ per capita of
population in 1995. —
 cEstimate. — ^Excluding Nicaragua. — including Nicaragua.
— including Honduras and Bahamas. — SAs listed in note a. — ^Excluding
Bahamas.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (a); UNCTAD (1997).Gib hot ho;:
Ins^itufs fur Waifwirf
Apart from the three principal recipients of German FDI in Latin America, only
Chile and Colombia accounted for a notable share in German FDI stocks of about
3 per cent in 1995. However, Germany's engagement in Colombia remained
rather weak when measured by per-capita FDI stocks. In Chile, German investors
continued to be underrepresented if Chile's share in FDI stocks of all foreign in-
vestors is taken as a yardstick. All remaining Latin American economies ac-
counted for less than 1 per cent of German FDI in 1995; and for almost all of
them the share declined between 1985 and 1995, notwithstanding the concurrent
trend towards market integration on a subregional level. During this period, re-
gional integration in Latin America does not appear to have improved the chances
of relatively small host economies to attract German FDI (see also Box 1).
2. Sectoral Characteristics
German FDI in Latin America is highly concentrated not only in few host coun-
tries, but also in few economic activities. While European FDI in general "has
tended to specialize in manufacturing" (IADB and IRELA 1996: 18), the focus on
manufacturing is particularly strong for German FDI (Table 3):
- Though having declined somewhat since 1985, manufacturing still accounted
for two thirds of overall German FDI stocks in Latin America in 1995.
- The focus of German investors on manufacturing was even stronger in the
three largest Latin American host countries.14
Box 1 — Regional Integration in Latin America: A Stimulus to German
FDI?
Regional integration is widely believed to provide a stimulus to FDI in Latin
America. For example, IADB and IRELA (1996: 57) argue that "firms are
increasingly tending to adopt subregional strategies - often as part of a global
approach to their business - to take advantage of larger, more integrated and
growing markets". An empirical test of this proposition with respect to German
FDI is difficult for two reasons. First, almost all Latin American countries are
members of one or more regional integration schemes, or at least associated with
such schemes (as Chile with Mercosur). Second, regional integration went along
with domestic economic policy reforms in various countries. Hence, it is almost
impossible to decide whether FDI reacted to improving investment conditions on
the national level, or to market integration on the regional level. In any case, the
relatively modest increase in German FDI flows to Latin America, as compared
with Asia (see Section II.2), suggests that institutionalized regionalism has been
less important than market-driven regionalization, taking into account that
institutionalized regionalism was largely absent in Asia.
Yet, German FDI trends in Latin American integration schemes may offer some
interesting insights, especially as concerns the locational attractiveness of
relatively small and less advanced member countries. The large country-bias of
German investors is most pronounced in Mercosur. The combined share of
Paraguay and Uruguay in German FDI stocks held in all four Mercosur countries
increased only marginally and remained below 1 per cent until 1995. In terms of
per-capita FDI stocks, however, the two smaller Mercosur members reveal
striking differences. Per-capita FDI stock was fairly high in Uruguay, which was15
characterized by a relatively high level and growth of per-capita income.
1 By this
measure, Uruguay proved to be most attractive for German FDI among all Latin
American economies with a population of less than 12 million listed in Table 2 in
the text. Per-capita FDI stock in less advanced and slow-growing Paraguay was
only a fraction of per-capita FDI stock in Uruguay.
Likewise, German FDI in the Andean Group was concentrated in the largest
member country, i.e., Colombia. In 1995, Colombia accounted for more than two
thirds of German FDI stocks located in the Andean Group (compared with 37 per
cent of FDI stocks of all foreign investors). At the same time, both Bolivia and
Peru hosted just marginal German FDI stocks, although these two economies
differed remarkably with respect to size, income level and economic growth.
The pattern of German FDI in the Central American Common Market (CACM)
is rather puzzling. The experience of Honduras indicates that regional integration
did not encourage German FDI in relatively small, less advanced and slow-
growing member countries. Surprisingly, however, German investors favored El
Salvador (measured by per-capita FDI stocks in 1995) over the largest member
country (Guatemala) and the most advanced economy (Costa Rica). This
contrasts sharply with the distribution of FDI stocks of all foreign investors within
CACM.
All in all, the impact of regional integration in Latin America on the distribution
of German FDI appears to be small. Additional German FDI, if any, tended to be
directed to the traditionally preferred host countries. With few exceptions, these
countries consisted of the largest and relatively advanced members of regional
integration schemes. This implies that regional integration is no promising means
1 We refer to per-capita income in US$ in 1995 and to average annual growth in 1985-1995
(World Bank 1997).16
for small and less advanced economies such as Bolivia, Honduras and Paraguay
to improve their attractiveness for German FDI.
- The shift from manufacturing towards other sectors was considerably less
pronounced for German FDI stocks than for FDI stocks of all foreign investors.
For instance, Mexico's tertiary sector accounted for 45 per cent of total FDI
stocks from all sources in 1995 (IADB and IRELA 1996: Statistical Annex,
Table 55), compared with less than 10 per cent of German FDI stocks.























































aln parentheses: corresponding share in FDI stocks of all investor countries, where available. —
b1992. — C1993.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (a); IADB and IRELA (1996: Tables 49, 51 and 55).
Furthermore, German FDI is concentrated in few manufacturing industries. The
four industries listed in Table 3 represented more than 80 per cent of17
manufacturing FDI stocks in Latin America in 1985 and 1995. In the case of
Mexico, the combined share of chemicals and transport equipment increased from
69 per cent in 1985 to 76 per cent in 1995. In Argentina and Brazil, the focus of
German investors on these two industries was persistently stronger than that of all
other foreign investors.
The less diversified nature of German FDI with regard to host countries,
economic sectors and manufacturing industries suggests that the strategy of
German firms in Latin America differed from that of firms from other investor
countries. Another issue discussed in the subsequent section concerns the
implications of the behavior of German investors for the German economy on the
one hand, and for Latin American host countries on the other hand.
IV. THE STRATEGY OF GERMAN FIRMS IN LATIN AMERICA
1. Different Internationalization Strategies
Before discussing major determinants of German FDI in Latin America, it is
important to note that German firms did not prefer FDI as a mode of
internationalization. While exporting dominated over FDI for all major investor
countries, this dominance was most pronounced for Germany (Table 4).
Comparing internationalization strategies on a worldwide scale, the FDI to
exports-ratio was about 2-3 times higher for France, Japan, the United Kingdom18
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (c); OECD (1996);
IMF (1996); UN (var. iss.).
and the United States than for Germany. Internationalization by means of outward
FDI figured more prominently in economic relations with Latin America than in
economic relations with the world as a whole. This applies to all industrial
countries, except France. The higher FDI to exports-ratio in economic relations
with Latin America is probably due to remaining import barriers that constrained
the internationalization strategies of foreign firms in this region. Strikingly,
however, German (and French) firms lagged significantly behind major
competitors in making use of FDI as a mode of internationalization in Latin
America.
The strong preference of exporting over FDI that characterizes the strategy of
German firms may have hindered their responsiveness to new investment
opportunities in Latin America. Furthermore, this preference implies that19
relocation of manufacturing activities to Latin America is a minor issue for
Germany. Labor market implications of FDI in Latin America, if any, should be
less pronounced in Germany than in Japan, the United Kingdom or the United
States.
2. Determinants of German FDI
Recent analyses of the determinants of German FDI^ cast further doubt on the
widely held view that FDI outflows have been a major cause of labor market
problems. Adverse effects on low-skilled workers in Germany might be expected
if FDI had been used mainly as a means of relocating relatively labor intensive
and standardized lines of manufacturing. Cost-related motivations would then
dominate over market-related motivations of FDI. However, exactly the opposite
pattern holds for German FDI (Box 2).
Especially in Latin America, German FDI was motivated primarily by tapping
large, and often protected host country markets. Cost-related factors were of
minor importance. Consequently, negative employment effects were highly
unlikely. Various observations support this line of reasoning. First, as noted
before, German FDI in Latin America was persistently concentrated in chemicals,
electrical equipment, machinery and transport equipment (see Box 3 for major
5 See, e.g., Klodt and Maurer (1996), Jost (1997), Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), and the
literature given there.20
Box 2 — FDI Determinants and Employment Effects in Germany
Various enterprise surveys and econometric analyses reveal that German FDI is
motivated mainly by market-related factors. For instance, two thirds of large
German enterprises surveyed in 1995 stated that they had invested abroad in
order to tap new markets. Securing market shares in traditional markets and
participating in host country growth were mentioned as major determinants of
FDI by more than half of these enterprises. Moreover, German FDI and German
exports to host countries are correlated positively. This means that FDI and
exports tend to be complementary elements of internationalization strategies. The
replacement of exports by FDI appears to be the exception, rather than the rule.
Cost-related determinants of German FDI have played a secondary role, but their
relevance has increased in recent years. Jost (1997) has found that a real ap-
preciation of the Deutschmark by 1 per cent, indicating a deterioration of Ger-
many's (price-related) international competitiveness, was associated with an in-
crease in German FDI outflows by 2.5 per cent. According to survey results,
small and medium-sized German enterprises increasingly referred to FDI as a
means to reduce production costs, notably by relocating labor intensive pro-
duction processes to Central and Eastern Europe.
Yet, a simple correlation between outward FDI stocks (in per cent of overall
capital assets) and the change in employment (1980-1994) across manufacturing
industries rejects the hypothesis of adverse employment effects of German FDI
(Klodt and Maurer 1996: 12 ff.). Employment losses should be concentrated in
industries with significant FDI activities, if FDI were motivated primarily by cost-
related factors. However, the employment record was relatively favorable in
almost all manufacturing industries in which outward FDI figured prominently.
This group comprises chemicals, electrical equipment, machinery and transport
equipment.21
characteristics of automobile production by German companies in Latin
America). All these industries have a relatively favorable employment record in
Germany, when the average change in employment in German manufacturing in
1980-1994 is taken as a yardstick (Klodt and Maurer 1996: Figure 5).
Second, German FDI in Latin America appears to be relatively capital intensive.
For lack of better data, the ratio of employees over sales is presented in Table 5
as a proxy to compare factor intensities of German and US FDI in different
regions. According to this indicator, US FDI in Latin America is somewhat more
labor intensive than German FDI.6 More importantly, German FDI was more
labor intensive in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asian developing countries
than in Latin America. This suggests that relocation of labor intensive production
has been of minor importance with regard to German FDI in Latin America.
Third, a simple correlation exercise underscores the particularly strong market
orientation of German investors in Latin America (Table 6). German investors
have in common with all foreign investors that FDI stocks (per capita of host
country population) tend to be higher in Latin American economies with
relatively high per-capita income. In contrast to FDI from all sources, however,
German FDI reveals a large country-bias: The correlation between per-capita FDI
" Note, however, that this difference is due exclusively to relatively labor intensive FDI of
the United States in Mexico.22
Box 3 — Operations of German Automobile Producers in Latin America:
Changing Strategies?
International activities of major German automobile producers reveal various
similarities to the pattern of overall German FDI in Latin America. First, there is a
strong bias towards Latin America. This region accounted for nearly two thirds of
Volkswagen's production of passenger cars in non-OECD countries in 1995
(VDA 1996: 30 f.). Its share in the production of trucks and buses by
Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz in non-OECD countries was still higher (85 per
cent). Second, production is extremely concentrated within Latin America.
Production activities of Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz are essentially restricted
to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In 1995, about 70 per cent of these companies'
total production in Latin America was located in Brazil. Third, automobile
production in Latin America was motivated primarily by tapping host country
markets that were protected against imports.
Import restrictions had as a consequence that exporting finished cars to Latin
American markets was no reasonable option for German automobile producers. It
was also difficult to provide affiliates operating in Latin America with imported
automotive inputs at internationally competitive terms. This, in turn, impaired the
international competitiveness of automotive items produced in Brazil. It is thus
not surprising that Latin American affiliates of German automobile companies
were hardly integrated into the parent companies' global networking in terms of
production sharing and sourcing. German imports of automotive items from
Brazil and Mexico, per unit of automobile production by German-owned
companies in these countries, were only a fraction of German imports of
automotive items from Spain (see Table). Though less pronounced, a similar
discrepancy prevails with regard to German exports of automotive items to
Brazil, Mexico and Spain.23
Table — Germany's Trade in Automotive Items with Selected Host
Countries of German FDI, 1995 (DM per unit produced by
German automobile companies in the respective host country)
Brazil Mexico Spain
German imports of
automobiles and parts 749 752 12 182
German exports of
automobiles and parts 2 610 4 654 10 844.
Source: VDA (1996).
Various automobile producers, including Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz, have
announced ambitious plans for additional FDI in Latin America (IADB and
IRELA 1996: 41). Concentration in the largest economies of the region is likely
to persist. Nevertheless, new investments may reflect a change in the strategy of
major automobile producers. A first indication to this effect is that producers are
integrating their operations in Argentina and Brazil. Proceeding Mercosur
integration seems to have induced an increasing division of labor on the
subregional level. Another indication is provided by Volkswagen's greenfield
investment for the production of buses and trucks in Resende (nearby Rio de
Janeiro). This project is said to represent a radical change towards modular
production in Brazil, involving a high degree of cooperation with suppliers of
parts and components. As it seems, corporate strategies were revised after Brazil
had initiated economic stabilization and liberalization measures. This suggests
that it will largely depend on local investment conditions whether Latin American
host countries will become an integral part of global networking among
production facilities of German automobile companies in various locations.Table 5 —
24
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Table 6— Per-capita FDI Stocks in Latin America in 1995: Pearson Correlations
with Host Country Characteristics
8
German FDI


















aSee Table 2 for per-capita FDI stocks and for the host countries under consideration;
number of observations = 15; ** (*) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (10) per
cent level.
Source: Table 2; World Bank (1997).25
stocks and the size of Latin American host countries (in terms of population)
turned out to be insignificant for all foreign investors, whereas it was highly
positive for German investors.
3. German Investors' Response to New Investment Opportunities in Latin
America
The less diversified nature of German FDI in Latin America seems to be a
relevant factor for explaining the relatively weak response of German investors to
new investment opportunities. For instance, the large country-bias may have
weakened the reaction of German investors to economic policy reforms in Chile.
In addition, the traditional focus on the manufacturing sector helps to explain the
underrepresentation of German investors in this country, where the primary sector
accounted for a high and rising share in overall FDI stocks held by all foreign
investors (1995: 59 per cent; IADB and IRELA 1996: Statistical Annex, Table
52). Table 6 provides more general support to the proposition of a rather weak
response of German investors to new investment opportunities ensuing from
policy reforms. In contrast to FDI from all sources, the correlation between per-
capita FDI stocks held by German investors in 1995 and average annual growth
of per-capita income in Latin American host countries turned out to be
insignificant.26
New investment opportunities were also offered by several Latin American
economies in the context of privatization programs (Nunnenkamp 1997a: 73-75).
Privatization mainly involved service activities such as telecommunications,
transportation, financing and electricity supply. FDI related to privatization
figured prominently, for example, in Argentina, Peru and Venezuela. Note that
the share of each of these countries in German FDI stocks declined between 1985
and 1995, whereas their share in FDI stocks of all foreign investors in Latin
America increased during the same period (Table 2). Similarly, German FDI
flows to Brazil dwindled from DM 1.7 billion in 1995 to DM 237 million in 1996
(Deutsche Bundesbank c), i.e., exactly when "Brazil strengthened its position as a
recipient of European FDI as a result of the sale of state assets through its
privatization programme" (IRELA 1997: 37). This strongly suggests that German
investors participated less in Latin American privatizations than investors from
other countries.
7
Arguably, German investors were at a competitive disadvantage in making use of
new investment opportunities in Latin America. US competitors may have
benefited from lower transaction costs because of proximity to, and institutional
ties with some Latin American economies (notably Mexico). For several reasons,
7 Direct evidence on the participation of German investors in Latin American privatizations
is lacking. However, investors from other countries appear to have been the dominant
players in major FDI projects in the context of privatization programs (IADB and IRELA
1996: 47 ff.).27
however, it is hardly convincing to blame exogenous factors for the rather
inflexible behavior of German investors:
- Latin American host countries did not discriminate against FDI from sources
other than the United States. To the contrary, some of them seem to be
interested in diversifying the sources of FDI inflows in order to reduce the
dominance of US investors.
- According to Figure 2, longer-term growth of German FDI stocks was
relatively weak not only compared with US FDI, but also compared with
Japanese FDI which is unlikely to have benefited from lower transaction costs.
- Various investors from other European countries participated successfully in
Latin American privatizations (IADB and IRELA 1996: 47 ff.).
Hence, inflexibility seems to be mainly due to specifically German factors. In
addition to structural features of German FDI, the strong bias towards exports
that has characterized the internationalization strategy of German firms for many
years may have reduced flexibility in responding to new investment opportunities.
This bias worked against German participation in the expanding services sector of
Latin American economies, considering that services mainly consist of non-
tradables.
8 Furthermore, various service activities in Germany remained strictly
8 Services accounted for 55 per cent of Latin America's GDP in 1995 (World Bank 1997:
Table 12). In 1990-1995, service sector growth amounted to 3.8 per cent per annum,
compared with industry growth of 2.5 per cent (ibid: Table 11). At the same time, the
share of the tertiary sector in total inward FDI stocks increased significantly in various
Latin American economies (IADB and IRELA 1996: Statistical Annex, Tables 49-57).28
regulated or were still run by inefficient state-owned enterprises. As a
consequence, there may have been a lack of competitive German bidders for
service companies to be privatized in Latin America. Finally, Table 5 points to a
fairly large average size of German FDI projects in Latin America, by the
standards of US FDI in Latin America and German FDI in other developing
regions. This implies that few large players dominated German FDI in Latin
America, while the underrepresentation of small and medium-sized German firms
may have further reduced adjustment flexibility.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
German FDI patterns in Latin America reveal various peculiarities, compared
with FDI from other sources in Latin America and German FDI in other
developing regions. These peculiarities have important implications for Germany
and Latin American host countries. A major conclusion for Germany is that past
FDI in Latin America is highly unlikely to have added to labor market problems.
Concerns in Germany should rather be that investors have made less use of new
investment opportunities in Latin America than foreign competitors. This may not
only impede closer investment relations with Latin America in the future. In the
longer run, German exports to this region may be negatively affected as well.
According to empirical evidence, FDI and exports tend to be complementary
means of international marketing and sourcing. This complementarity will29
increasingly dominate over substitution effects between particular elements of
internationalization strategies if the trend towards liberalizing external trade and
deregulating FDI continues.
Likewise, concerns about FDI diversion currently prevailing in Latin America
seem to be misplaced. The particularly keen interest of German firms to invest in
Central and Eastern Europe is unlikely to have resulted in significant redirection
of FDI to the detriment of Latin America. Empirical evidence rather suggests that
German FDI in different regions complements each other. This is not to ignore
that the characteristical features of past German FDI involve some risks for Latin
American host countries:
- First of all, the predominant orientation of German investors towards host
country markets may become weaker in the future. The current trend towards
globalized production and marketing tends to alter the form and purpose of
FDI. Geographically dispersed manufacturing and the combination of markets
and resources through investment and trade are increasingly becoming an
integral part of the world economy. As a consequence, "one of the most
important traditional FDI determinants, the size of national markets, has
decreased in importance. At the same time, cost differences between locations,
the quality of infrastructure, the ease of doing business and the availability of
skills have become more important" (UNCTAD 1996: 97). Multinational firms
from different countries may respond to different degree and with varying30
speed to the changing international environment, but German FDI is unlikely to
remain unaffected in the longer run if the balance shifts from market-seeking to
efficiency-seeking FDI.
More specifically, trade liberalization has weakened the incentive to undertake
FDI in order to surmount import barriers. This involves a critical dilemma for
Latin America where, traditionally, the bulk of FDI was market-seeking rather
than efficiency-seeking. In the longer run, the move towards liberalization of
trade and deregulation of FDI is instrumental to closer integration of Latin
American economies into global sourcing and marketing networks of
multinational enterprises, as this move supports specialization according to
comparative advantage. In the short term, however, vanishing constraints
concerning the mode of integrating Latin America into corporate strategies may
have as a result that exporting becomes more attractive than FDI. This may
affect German FDI in the first place, taking into account that German firms, in
general, reveal a strong preference of exporting over FDI. Furthermore, recent
trade patterns indicate that Latin America still lacks international
competitiveness in industries traditionally preferred by German investors.
Revealed comparative advantage was negative in 1994 for the chemical
industry as well as for machinery and transport equipment.^
Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is calculated as: RCAj = (Xj - M,) : (X,- + M,),
with: X = exports, M = imports, i = manufacturing industries. RCA may range from -1 (no
exports) to 1 (no imports). In 1994, RCA was -0.41 for chemicals and -0.35 for machinery31
In summary, future investment relations between Germany and Latin America
will depend on whether Latin American host countries succeed in improving
international competitiveness in industries in which German FDI is concentrated.
The revival of regional integration in Latin America may be a mixed blessing in
this respect. It may lead to a more efficient division of labor on the regional level
and, thus, induce FDI from companies adopting regional or subregional strategies.
However, regional integration is not sufficient to remain attractive for FDI. It
basically aims at market-seeking FDI, which tends to be concentrated in large and
relatively advanced member countries of regional integration schemes. The
chances to attract efficiency-seeking FDI may even deteriorate if regional
integration is pursued in a way that discriminates significantly against non-
member countries. It is openness towards world markets which matters most for
becoming integrated into globalized production and marketing.
and transport equipment (calculated on the basis of data from UN, var. iss.). RCA turned
out to be negative (-0.13) for passenger road vehicles, too, although imports in this sub-
sector of machinery and transport equipment were seriously restricted in various Latin
American countries.32
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